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Abstract: Solvency II requirements introduced new issues for actuarial risk management in non-life
insurance, challenging the market to have a consciousness of its own risk profile, and also
investigating the sensitivity of the solvency ratio depending on the insurance risks and technical
results on either a short-term and medium-term perspective. For this aim, in the present paper,
a partial internal model for premium risk is developed for three multi-line non-life insurers, and the
impact of some different business mixes is analyzed. Furthermore, the risk-mitigation and profitability
impact of reinsurance in the premium risk model are introduced, and a global framework for a feasible
application of this model consistent with a medium-term analysis is provided. Numerical results are
also figured out with evidence of various effects for several portfolios and reinsurance arrangements,
pointing out the main reasons for these differences.
Keywords: multi-year solvency analysis; collective risk model; reinsurance; premium risk
1. Introduction
The new prudential regime of the European insurance industry came in force on 1 January 2016.
As well-known new risk-based Non-Life solvency capital requirements can be derived by a Standard
Formula (SF), whose factor-based methodology has been calibrated on non-life insurers across
European markets, regulation provides also the possibility using Undertaking Specific Parameters
(USP) according to a prefixed model structure to estimate volatility. Moreover, a partial/full Internal
Model (IM) may be adopted under formal approval by Member State supervisors and developed by
insurers on the basis of their own specific risk profile (see (European Commission 2015)).
Actually, most small and medium-sized insurance companies rely on SF while only the largest
insurers adopt at least a Partial IM, so that the financial strength of the European insurance market
can be ensured by a reasonable implementation and calibration of the standard model. By examining
the adequacy of the methodology provided by Solvency II SF, some inconsistencies of the approach
proposed by delegated regulation have been emphasized (see, e.g., (Clemente and Savelli 2017)
for non-life underwriting risk); this can lead to an over/under-estimation of the solvency capital
requirement for some insurers, and it is relevant from the supervisor’s perspective.
Focusing on reinsurance recognition in the new regulation, the solution provided by Solvency
II SF is based on a lognormal distribution assumption. This approach can lead to an overestimation
of the risk mitigating effect of this kind of reinsurance (see (Clemente 2018)), because it neglects
the systematic component that usually affects the number of claims (see (Daykin et al. 1994);
(Gisler 2009); and (Savelli and Clemente 2009)), while proportional reinsurance does not affect net
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aggregate claims’ cost distribution, but insurers’ risk profile can change because of reinsurance pricing
(see (Clemente et al. 2015)).
Today, collective risk modeling (see (Daykin et al. 1994); (Klugman et al. 2008);
and (Albrecher et al. 2017)) has become a popular stochastic model for premium risk in non-life
insurance actuarial risk management (see (Sandstrom 2011)). These models, other than being more
practical, have more feasibility to incorporate a classical risk-mitigating technique such as reinsurance,
modeling its impact on the solvency position. This approach, considering also reinsurance, can improve
insurers’ consciousness of their own risk profile and business strategy on either a short-term or a
medium-term time horizon (see (Venter 2001)).
New governance and disclosure requirements have by far been paying more attention to
quantitative risk management, and they oblige insurers to assess the dynamic behavior of their
main sources of risk and profitability on the basis of company’s industrial plan, as well as their
interconnections (see (Cesari and Valerio 2019)). Furthermore, as a component of its risk-management
system every insurer shall conduct its Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA), providing a
comprehensive and complete vision of risks embedded in their business represented by the overall
solvency needs, in order to assess both the present and the forward-looking solvency position of the
company (see (George 2013)). Insurers should consider capital adequacy across the entire planning
period, and the dynamic content is provided by the projection of future financial position including
capital requirements (SCR) and Own Funds (OF), fixing a target capital ratio that insurers must not
breach, in order to assess the going concern about the insurance company and opportunely planning
its capital level (i.e., paying dividends).
Although, at the moment, this is far from influencing reinsurance purchasing decision of
undertakings, growth of their risk appetite has recently been observed (see (Willis 2018)), which
helps insurers make better decisions about reinsurance coverage options. For most of the European
companies, risk appetite statements optimize reinsurance because they drive decisions on capital and
profits. In this context, regulatory capital is the key capital measure used for reinsurance decisions,
which has increased during the last decade due to the new prudential regime. Nevertheless, a lower
volatility and stable profits are key drivers for reinsurance purchasing. Reinsurance mitigation is
becoming an important component of insurers’ capital management strategy, driving key business
decisions, such as, among others, earnings, dividend policy, and business strategy.
The impact of reinsurance in the Solvency II capital assessment should be analyzed since its effects
on regulatory requirement are wide-spreading, becoming an important factor when insurers have
to select a reinsurance contract. This analysis can be done through the development of an IM over
a multi-year time horizon, considering all the risks with which the insurance company are dealing.
More specifically, a three-year analysis should be done consistently with the insurers’ industrial plan,
whose importance in terms of medium-term risk and business assumptions is effectively recognized
by the new prudential regime.
In this framework, it is possible to introduce an SCR based on different time horizons and
confidence levels (see (International Actuarial Association 2004)). Other than the SCR provided by
Solvency II on the basis of an event that can occur one time every two hundred years over the following
twelve months, an alternative capital requirement can be introduced, based on considering an event
that can occur one time in 20 years over the following thirty six months.
This work is aimed at defining an actuarial model from the short-term to the medium-term
assessment of non-life insurers’ risk profile, investigating the Solvency II approach for the premium
risk net of reinsurance.
In particular, in Section 2, a risk-capital model for the risk reserve of a non-life insurer in the
presence of reinsurance is given. Section 3 describes the structure of the Solvency II regime for
non-life insurance, focusing on premium risk net of reinsurance. Finally, in Section 4, numerical results
are reported by focusing on the terms of solvency ratio, and in particular on the solvency capital
requirements calculated by either SF or our simplified IM, incorporating reinsurance. In Section 5,
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we investigate the impact of two alternative portfolio mixes by a numerical analysis of the differences
between these two mixes and the original one. Section 6 extends this framework for a medium-term
risk profile assessment consistent with the ORSA exercise. Section 7 develops the multi-year solvency
model and tries to extend the definition of the capital requirements on a medium-term perspective
as well.
2. A Model in Order to Assess Risk Profile of Non-Life Insurers in Presence of Reinsurance
In classical risk theory literature stochastic risk reserve U˜ (net of reinsurance) at the end of year t
using the Collective Risk Model (CRM) is given by the relation:
U˜t = Ut−1 +
[
L
∑
h=1
[
(Bt,h − Et,h − X˜t,h)− (BREt,h − CREt,h − X˜REt,h )
]]
, (1)
where the big square bracket represents the random variable (r.v.)1 of a one-year technical result Y˜NETt
for the period (t− 1, t), evaluated at the end of year t− 1, as the difference between insurance and
reinsurance results. Gross earned premiums (Bt,h), the stochastic aggregate claims amount of year
t related to new business2 X˜t,h and general and acquisition expenses Et,h, with h = 1, ..., L Lines of
Business (LoB), are realised at the end of the year. Actually, in a calendar year insurers must take into
account both earned and written premiums in their market-consistent valuation of assets and liabilities
introduced by Solvency II with the new Economic Balance Sheet, but for practical purpose it is here
assumed that earned premiums are equal to the written premiums3. Neither dividends nor taxation
are considered in the model.
With regard to the original insurer’s portfolio, for each LoB the initial gross written premiums
Bt,h (GWP) are composed by gross risk premiums (Pt,h = E(X˜t,h)), safety loadings applied as a quota
(constant) of the gross risk premiums (λh · Pt,h) and the expenses loading as a (constant) coefficient
applied on the GWP (ch · Bt,h):
Bt,h = Pt,h + λh · Pt,h + ch · Bt,h. (2)
Underlying assumption about expenses is that they are deterministic and then they are affected by a
stochastic behaviour. In other words, in premium risk might be implicitly included also the expense
risk (together with claims risk), linked to the volatility of the expense amount, whatever method is
used to the standard deviation of premium risk evaluation, but here we neglect this component also
because for many non-life segments it is rather negligible (because of the short term duration). It is
also assumed that safety loading coefficient λh is kept constant over the time horizon.
In Equation (1) BREt,h denotes the written premium volume ceded to reinsurer in the h-th LoB
whereas X˜REt,h and C
RE
t,h are respectively the amount of claim refunded by reinsurer and the reinsurance
commissions, the latter is supposed to be equal to a (constant4) coefficient applied on the gross
premium volume ceded to reinsurer (CREt,h = c
RE
t,h · BREt,h ). Note that either BREt,h and cREt,h depend on the
1 When a tilde is taken on a character, then it will mean that it is a random variable.
2 Claims cost of the year incorporate both payments for claims incurred during the year and the provisions for new claims
(X˜t = X˜
paid,CY
t,h + V˜
S
t,h). Regarding premium risk, both payments and reserves for claims incurred in previous year are
necessarily covered by initial claims reserve. Indeed, their volatility attains to reserve risk.
3 Earned premiums are the difference between written premium of the year and the one-year change in premium reserve for
unearned premiums and unexpired risk (Bt,h = Bwrittent,h − V˜Pt,h +VPt−1,h).
4 Reinsurance commissions can also be stochastic: C˜REt,h = c˜
RE
t,h · BREt,h .
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type of reinsurance arranged as well as the reinsurer’s share X˜REt,h . As for original portfolio, also for
reinsurance written premiums composition we can obtain:
BREt,h = P
RE
t,h + λ
RE
h · PREt,h + cREh · BREt,h . (3)
To evaluate characteristics of Y˜NETt , we can make some assumptions about total claims cost for
the h-th LoB gross and net of reinsurance. The aggregate claim amount X˜t,h for each LoB in original
insured portfolio is given by a collective approach where X˜t,h is assumed to be a mixed compound
Poisson process5 where claim size Z˜ have expected value m and coefficient of variation (CoV) cZ˜.
Regarding premium risk only, both payments and reserves for claims incurred in previous years
are necessarily covered by initial claims reserve and their volatility attains to reserve risk. Actually,
reserving for outstanding claims is one of the central topics of modern actuarial theory and practise
but it is here assumed that claims occurred in accounting year t they are finally settled in the same year
and therefore no claims provision at the end of the year is needed. As for the original aggregate claim
amount, as well as for reinsurer’s share X˜REt,h , we can assume a mixed compound Poisson process:
X˜REt,h =
K˜REt,h
∑
i=1
Z˜REi,t,h (4)
depending on the type and the parameters of the reinsurance treaty in force.
Reinsurance treaties are often arranged on a claim by claim basis (i.e., Excess of Loss coverages);
this means that each separate claim is divided between cedant and reinsurer and we have no impact
on claims count (K˜REt,h = K˜t,h), where clearly the claim size distribution must be an unconditional
expression. With regard to severity, the size of an individual claim net of reinsurance can be written as
Z˜NETi,t,h = Z˜i,t,h − Z˜REi,t,h. (5)
It is possible to model gross premiums and claims separately from the impact of reinsurance on
them, allowing direct assessment of the effects of different reinsurance strategies both on a company’s
expected performance and solvency. Then we consider the aggregate claim amount net of reinsurance:
Γ˜t,h = X˜t,h − X˜REt,h =
K˜t,h
∑
i=1
Z˜NETi,t,h , (6)
that is defined as stochastic insurer’s net retention. We can find main characteristics and probability
distributions of claim variables net of reinsurance, and of reinsurer’s share, in order to assess risk
profile of the “reinsured” insurer. The probability distribution function and the risk premium of the
net aggregate claims cost can be obtained from a function of original aggregate claims amount and
reinsurer’s share, given the type and the parameters of the reinsurance treaty in force. Introducing the
new notation for reinsurance arrangements, risk reserve Equation (1) can be rewritten as:
U˜t = Ut−1 +
[
L
∑
h=1
[
(Bt,h − Et,h)− (BREt,h − CREt,h )− Γ˜t,h
]]
, (7)
where technical result net of reinsurance for the period (t− 1, t) in the square bracket can be also
written as:
Y˜NETt =
L
∑
h=1
[
(Bt,h − BREt,h )− (Et,h − CREt,h )− Γ˜t,h
]
. (8)
5 See (Daykin et al. 1994) and (Klugman et al. 2008) for an extensive treatment of CRM.
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For their natural implementation in CRM applied on insurance business, we will moreover
concentrate on two classical reinsurance strategies, the Quota Share (QS) and the Excess of Loss (XL)
treaties, showing how these arrangements impact on non-life insurers’ risk profile. This kind of
analysis is needed accordingly with new European insurance regulation that ask to European insurers
to calculate their solvency capital requirements considering contracts arranged with reinsurers, which
in turn are asked to fulfill minimum capital requirements introduced with Solvency II directive.
2.1. Quota Share
In the case of Quota Share reinsurance treaty, with insurer’s retention quota for the h-th LoB αh
(with αhe[0, 1]) fixed for each claim (Z˜NETi,t,h = αh · Z˜i,t,h), reinsurer’s share for each claim and reinsurer
total claims cost are Z˜REi,t,h = (1− αh) · Z˜i,t,h and X˜REt,h = (1− αh) · X˜t,h respectively, so that we obtain in
a very trival way for the retained claims cost (6):
Γ˜t,h = αh · X˜t,h. (9)
Written premium volume ceded to reinsurer (3) is:
BREt,h = (1− αh) · Bt,h = (1− αh) ·
[
(1+ λh) · Pt,h + ch · Bt,h
]
, (10)
whereas reinsurer commission paid by reinsurer to primary insurer is CREt,h = c
RE
t,h · BREt,h with a constant
resinsurance expenses loading coefficient commonly established by reinsurer. Another way to consider
commission, that is more coherent with real proportional treaty, assumes that reinsurer pays to cedant
sliding commission that rewards or penalizes primary insurer according to the ex-post profitability of
portfolio protected by the treaty, i.e., a random commission rate whose value depends on the observed
Loss Ratio is usually introduced. Reinsurer’s safety loadings coefficient is usually fixed at the same
value of the coefficient charged by the cedant (λREh = λh). It implies that the reinsurer may agree to
fix reinsurance commission to pay back to the primary insurer which provided the business, but he
accepts not to charge a different safety loadings coefficient than cedant; in this way the real reinsurance
pricing process is nested in the commission rate mechanism. In other words, in Quota Share it is
usually assumed that both insurer and reinsurer agree to charge the same safety loadings coefficient
on risk premiums so the latter is accepting the underwriting policy of primary insurer. Indeed, they
are simply sharing initial portfolio variability as well as profit achieved from the contracts in force
with original policyholders. Then it is implicitly assumed that insurer and reinsurer are using same
technical basis, i.e., frequency, severity, etc., in premium rating.
Gross-to-net adjustment factor for premium volume of a single LoB in the case of QS reinsurance
is given by BNET/B = αh.
Consequently, equation of the insurance technical result (8) after QS reinsurance is given by:
Y˜NETt =
L
∑
h=1
[[E(Γ˜t,h) + (λh · PNETt,h − ∆cREt,h · BREt,h )]− Γ˜t,h], (11)
where the term ∆cREt,h = ct,h − cREt,h represents reinsurance pricing effect on QS treaty, applied directly on
premium volume ceded to reinsurer. Usually the difference is non-negative and it assumes the value
zero when reinsurer refunds entirely to primary insurer the same expenses loading coefficient charged
on the original risk premium volume. With regards to safety loading coefficient, it’s decreasing by
retained quota only and it derives from assumption that both cedant and reinsurer use same technical
basis as described above. On the other hand, pure premium is decreasing by retention quota as well as
the aggregate claims cost.
In QS treaties, moments of cedant’s share (Γ˜t,h) directly depends on initial aggregate claims
amount since the former is a linear transformation of the latter, with proportional factor equal to the
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retained quota αh. Then basic characteristics of the cedant’s share can be computed by transforming
the characteristics of the initial aggregate claim amount6.
2.2. Excess of Loss
In a per risk Excess-of-Loss (XL) treaty, signed for a single LoB7, for the projected year t reinsurer
pays the excess Z˜REi,t = max[0; Z˜i,t −Mt] over an agreed amount in respect of each claim Mt, called
priority, projected over the following years by the claim inflation rate (in a similar way as Z˜t is rescaled
over each year as afore mentioned). In the next part of this section, for sake of simplicity, we will
disregard the time index t.
In this paper, we are concerned with per claim excess of loss reinsurance, where the cedant’s
retention is defined for each claim in a certain group of risks, reinsurer paying the excess if a claim
exceeds the retention level M, and there is no limit to reinsurer exposure. Cedant’s share of the claim is
Z˜NETi,t = min[Z˜i,t; Mt].
It is worth emphasizing that, under assumptions that the aggregate claim amount X˜ is a compound
variable with claim size distribution function S(Z˜) and that all risks are reinsured using the same
retention limit M, the net aggregate claim amount Γ˜ is also a compound variable having the same
claim number variable K˜ but with claim size d.f. SM that depends from the d.f. of the gross claim size:
SM(Z˜) =
{
S(Z˜) Z˜ < M
1 otherwise
. (12)
More generally, k-th moments of the cedant’s share of a claim are given by:
ak,Z˜NET = E(Z˜
NETk) =
∫ M
−∞
Zk dS(Z) + Mk · (1− S(M)) (13)
consequently, risk indices of claim size distribution (see (Savelli 2002)) are rk,Z˜NET = ak,Z˜NET /(a1,Z˜NET )
k.
Moments of the reinsurer’s share can be obtained from Equation (13) as:
ak,Z˜RE =
k
∑
i=1
(
k
i
)
· (−M)k−i · [ai − ai,Z˜NET ], (14)
where ai = ai(∞) = ak,Z˜. Note that value of Z˜
RE is zero whenever the size of a claim is smaller than
the retention limit M.
The main characteristics of cedant’s share in an excess of loss treaty can now be easily computed
through basic characteristics of the cedant’s share of individual claims net of reinsurance Z˜NET .
With regard to severity, many distributions may be used for modeling cost of a single claim
in actuarial practice and, among others, LogNormal and Pareto distribution are the most popular;
the latter usually better fits heavy tail distribution whereas the former often represent so-called
attritional claim8. On the other hand, the Solvency II framework has defined a standardized capital
requirement assuming a LogNormal distribution not only for premium risk, one of the main risk
factors of non-life insurance, but also for reinsurance mitigation recognition. Anyhow, the lognormal
assumption is taken in our simulation model but it is not clearly failing the consistency of our
general framework.
6 See (Clemente et al. 2015).
7 We avoid to refer to h-th LoB in some formulas of this subsection for practical purpose.
8 See (Clemente et al. 2014) and EIOPA Calibration Paper on Premium and Reserve Risk.
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Under the assumption of LogNormality for the claim size distribution, the k-th moments of the
net claim size are given by:
ak,Z˜NET = e
kµ+ 12 k
2σ2 · Fµ+kσ2,σ(M) + Mk · [1− Fµ,σ(M)], (15)
where Fµ,σ(M) is the cumulative distribution function of a r.v. LogNormal distributed with
generic parameters µ and σ computed in point M. Parameters are obtained by the well-known
Normal-to-LogNormal parameters changing formulas µ = 2 · ln m− ln a22 and σ2 =
√
ln a2 − 2 · ln m.
Then net expected claim size can be obtained as:
mM = m · Fµ+σ2,σ(M) + M · [1− Fµ,σ(M)], (16)
in which we can fix the retention limit as M = E(Z˜) + k · σ(Z˜) where k is a multiplier of claim size
standard deviation. Therefore, as for expected claim size, also net risk premium given by the formula
PM = n ·mM is a concave, continuous, increasing function of retention limit M (See Figure 1).
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80
Gross Claim size CV=2 CV=7 CV=12
K
Figure 1. Expected single claim size mM for different cZ˜ and retention limit (by multiplicative factor k).
With regard to reinsurer risk premium PRE, it is given by the well-known relationship:
PRE = E(X˜RE) = E(K˜) · E(Z˜RE) = n · (m−mM). (17)
In the present model, expected value of Z˜RE is easily computed taking into account the LogNormal
distribution with given initial parameters rescaled every year by the inflation rate i only. Reinsurance
risk premium will be relatively small compared to the original risk premium if retention limit is
growing up.
We compute the second moment of single claim cost in order to study its retained volatility, from
formula (15) we obtain:
a2,Z˜NET = (σ
2
Z + m
2) · Fµ+2σ2,σ(M) + M2 · [1− Fµ,σ(M)] (18)
and consequently also net risk indices change (See Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Gross-to-net a2,Z˜ (Left) and r2,Z˜ (Right) for different cZ˜ and retention limit (by multiplicative
factor k).
Then, in the case of per risk XL treaty the reinsurer’s aggregate claim amount is also a compound
variable, but the number of non-zero claims is usually much smaller for a reinsurer, then stochastic
claim amount charged to the reinsurer for year t is:
X˜RE =
K˜
∑
i=1
max[0; Z˜i −M]. (19)
The retained claims cost (6) in excess of loss reinsurance is given by the following formula:
Γ˜ =
K˜
∑
i=1
min[M; Z˜i]. (20)
Its basic characteristics directly depend by the lowest three net retained moments about the origin
ak(Z˜NET) introduced above:
E(Γ˜) = n ·mM = E(X˜) ·
(mM
m
)
,
σ(Γ˜) = n · a2,Z˜NET + n2 ·m2M · σ2q = (n ·m)2 ·
(
r2,Z
n
· a2,Z˜NET
a2,Z
+ σ2q ·
(mM
m
)2)
,
γ(Γ˜) =
n · a3,Z˜NET + 3n2 ·mM · a2,Z˜NET · σ2q + n3 ·m3M · µ3,q
(n · a2,Z˜NET + n2 ·m2M · σ2q )
3
2
.
(21)
It can be easily shown how this kind of reinsurance changes primary insurer risk profile.
Under assumptions of the CRM made above, the ratio between coefficient of variation of the aggregate
net and gross claims cost is:
CoV(Γ˜)
CoV(X˜)
=
√√√√√ 1+c ˜ZNETn + σ2q
1+cZ˜
n + σ
2
q
. (22)
Equation (22) for different cZ and retention limit (by the multiplicative factor k) is reported in the
next Figure 3, where all ratios between net and gross CoV of the aggregate claims cost stay between
80% and 100%, decreasing as the CoV of single claims cost of the LoB grows.
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It emphasizes that adjustment factor for non-proportional reinsurance provided by Solvency II
delegated regulation—it is 80% for some LoBs, potentially decreased by using USP for this factor—has
been fixed as the lower bound of the range of y-values in order to emphasize this potential shortfall.
70%
80%
90%
100%
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80
 CV=2 CV=7 CV=12 NP(LoB)
K
Figure 3. Gross-to-net coefficient of variation (CoV) for different cZ˜ and retention limit (by the
multiplicative factor k).
Now we analyze impacts of XL reinsurance on both solvency and profitability terms in Equation (7)
by reintroducing segmentation between several LoBs. In the case of XL reinsurance treaty, for each
LoB the safety loading coefficient λREh is kept constant over the full time horizon and it is assumed
deterministic. Safety loading coefficient in non-proportional treaties is usually greater than the one
applied by insurer, and it increases as insurer’s retention limit is growing up. No explicit commissions
are usually provided in case of excess of loss coverage, so that for reinsurance written premiums (3)
we get:
BREt,h = (1+ λ
RE
h ) · PREt and cREt,h = 0. (23)
Under the assumptions made above equation of insurance net technical result (8) after XL
reinsurance can be rewritten as:
Y˜NETt =
L
∑
h=1
[
[E(Γ˜t,h) + (λh · Pt,h − λREh · PREt ]− Γ˜t,h
]
. (24)
3. Solvency II Regulation for Non-Life Insurance
The new European solvency system (shortly Solvency II) has structured insurance solvency
supervision according to a three-pillar approach as Basle II and for the first time an economic risk-based
approach across all EU Member States has been introduced (see (European Commission 2015)).
Solvency Capital Requirement (shortly SCR) is calibrated in order to take into account all quantifiable
risk to which insurance or reinsurance undertaking is exposed and its definition is based on a
modular approach. The SCR must be compared with undertakings’ eligible basic Own Funds (OF),
they are the available financial resources as the difference between assets and liabilities of the economic
balance sheet imposed by the new regulation. Definitely, Solvency II came in force on 1 January 2016.
More specifically, in Pillar I, insurance and reinsurance undertakings will be required to “held
an economic capital equal to an amount, the SCR, computed in order to ensure that ruin occurs no
more often than one in every 200 cases over the following 12 months” (alternatively, a probability
of default of 99.5% is considered). The European Parliament and the council of the European Union
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selected Value-at-Risk (VaR9) of basic own fund of an insurance or reinsurance undertaking subject to
a confidence level of 99.5% over a one-year period as measure of risk on basis of which SCR must be
calculated. On the basis of model presented in Section 2 it can be written as:
SCRt = VaR99.5%(U˜t+1 −Ut). (25)
Obviously, when calculating the SCR, insurance and reinsurance undertakings may take account
of any financial or insurance risk-mitigation techniques they have arranged (i.e., reinsurance contracts
and special purpose vehicles or financial derivatives) provided that credit risk and other risk arising
from the use of such techniques are properly reflected in the calculation. Solvency II aims to appropriate
recognize all risk categories an insurance company faces and all the risk mitigation techniques that
insurers use to reduce exposure and thereby lower their risk capital. This marks a departure from
Solvency I and its limited recognition of risk mitigation techniques.
Pillar II allows insurance and reinsurance undertakings to calculate the SCR either in accordance
with the (more general) Standard Formula (SF) provided by regulation, or using, partially or fully,
an Internal Model (IM). The latter is an undertaking specific method in such a way that insurers must
build a model based on the own undertaking risk profile, whereas SF is a standardized calculation
method since it was calibrated by insurance regulation on market average basis10. It is composed by
factors reflective of the average size and performance of the portfolios of insurers in the European
market. The directive describes requirements applying to insurance and reinsurance undertakings
using, or willing to use, a full or partial internal model in the calculation of the SCR. Such models are
subjected to prior supervisory approval on the basis of specific processes and standards, particularly
regard the use test, statistical quality, calibration, validation and documentation. Actually, internal
model development is one of the most important research areas in risk theory since insurers are
increasingly stimulated.
Finally, Pillar III has introduced some disclosure requirements that all European insurance
companies have to provide to either market and supervisors. In particular, among others, they
must report the Regular Supervisory Report (RSR) and the Own Risk and Solvency Assessment
(ORSA) to the supervisors, incorporating some specific analysis of undertakings risk profile and a
deep assessment of business strategy on the basis of company’s industrial plan.
Now we will focus on quantitative requirements and how to calculate them. As pointed out by
QIS exercise carried out from EIOPA in the last decade, for non-life insurers the underwriting risk
module has the greatest impact on SCR. With regard to SF for non-life underwriting risk, delegated
acts have established a unique sub-module for the joined valuation of risks related both to future
claims arising during and after the period until the one-year time horizon for the solvency assessment
(premium risk) and to a non-sufficient amount of technical provisions for old claims (reserve risk).
The derived capital charge must be then aggregated to lapse and cat risk to quantify the capital
requirement for non-life underwriting risk.
Analyzing SF in order to compare vary capital requirements evaluations, we obtain that capital
requirement for premium and reserve Risk is equal to the following formula:
SCRSFt = 3 · σNL ·Vt,NL, (26)
where Vt,NL is the volume measure (gross or net of reinsurance) that consists of the sum of the volume
measures for premium and reserve risk of segments (LoB) involved in insurer’s business eventually
decreased for the geographical diversification and σNL is the standard deviation of ratio between
9 It measures the potential loss in value of a risky asset or portfolio over a defined time horizon for a given confidence level.
10 Standard formula has been calibrated by EIOPA through the four Quantitative Impact Studies (QIS), carried on the whole
EU insurance market on a voluntary basis by solo/group insurers.
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aggregate claims amount of premium and reserve Risk and the volume measure, and then it is strictly
related to the coefficient of variation (CoV) of their distributions.
Ignoring reserve risk, formula (26) in the case of premium risk only can be written as:
SCRSFt,Pre = 3 · σPre ·Vt,Pre. (27)
Non-life insurance segmentation between LoBs and their standard deviation have been set out by
delegated acts in Annexes I and II respectively. Actually, formula (27) assumes to measure the distance
between the 99,5% quantile and the mean of the probability distribution of aggregate claims amount
by using a fixed multiplier of the standard deviation equal to 311.
The standard deviation for premium risk is given by the aggregation of the L different LoBs
s = [σ1, ..., σh, ..., σL] using a fixed12 correlation matrix R:
σPre =
√
sRs’
Vt,Pre
. (28)
Non-life insurance LoBs in Solvency II framework have been defined by Annex I of the delegated
acts in a similar way as those already in force in European annual accounts legislation. For our
purposes LoBs of interest, in according with EIOPA’s labeling, are defined by:
• 4) Motor Vehicle Liability insurance (MVL): obligations which cover all liabilities arising out of
the use of motor vehicles operating on land;
• 5) Other Motor insurance (OM): obligations which cover all damage to or loss of land vehicles;
• 8) General Liability insurance (GL): obligations which cover all liabilities other than those in the
LoB 4.
In this evaluation, risk mitigation effect of proportional and non-proportional reinsurance is
recognized. Generally, an insurer takes out a reinsurance cover for his insurance portfolio to increase
his underwriting capacity decreasing the variation of aggregate claims cost and consequently his
probability of ruin; in other words insurers adopt insurance risk-mitigation techniques in order to
decrease their risk of insolvency. All these practises have been opportunely considered by new
European insurance solvency system, and in delegated acts regulator has provided a suitable formula
in order to take into account reinsurance as a risk-mitigation technique in new insurance solvency
capital requirements. The net standard deviation of the h-th LoB in vector s of Equation (29) according
to Solvency II is given by:
σh = σPre,h · NPLoB, (29)
where gross volatility factors σPre,h are showed in the next Table 1 for the three important LoBs
introduced above which will be uses later in this paper for our numerical analysis:
Table 1. Premium Risk Volatility factors for Lines of Business (LoBs)—Delegated Acts, Annex II.
LoB OM MVL GL
Standard deviation 8% 10% 14%
Formula (29) shows how values of gross standard deviation only for premium risk in Table 1
can be multiplied by a proportional factor in order to take into account risk mitigation effect arising
from existing particular XL treaties. The calculation of the premium risk SCR in non-life underwriting
11 It is worth mentioning that, under the assumption of a Log-Normal distribution for the aggregate claims cost, this multiplier
holds only when σPre is roughly 14.47%. It turns to overestimate capital requirement for big insurers they usually have
smaller volatility coefficients.
12 Correlation parameters for two different segments are given by the correlation matrix set out in Annex IV of delegated acts.
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risk module of the SF is based on the principle of a correction factor for the disproportionate risk
reduction arising out of non-proportional reinsurance treaties they shall be considered recognizable.
Notwithstanding, SF provides a factor model based on predefined standard deviations for each class
of insurance and the premium volume of each LoB, a correction factor is needed to reduce the gross
standard deviation to a level commensurate with the risk in case insurance undertaking has provided
a suitable non-proportional treaty for its lines of business. The basic idea behind this approach
is to calculate an adjustment factor which is designed to consider non-proportional reinsurance
risk-absorbing effect. The non-life underwriting risk module of the SF is based on volume measures
such as premiums and reserves and uses predefined standard deviations per LoB to calculate the
SCR. In order to appropriately capture the risk-mitigating effect of non-proportional reinsurance,
the adjustment factor is designed to lower the standard deviation. Delegated acts has set this factor
out at 80% for Property, Motor Vehicle Liabilities (MVL), and General Liabilities (GL) and 100% for all
other LoBs.
Following Solvency II directive, volume measure is equal to the maximum between last year and
next year earned premiums plus the expected present value of future premiums after one-year for
existing contracts and contracts of the following year. Delegated acts SF allows undertakings to take
into account a geographical diversification of business held in different macro-geographical regions
of the world, through the Herfindahl Index but it will not be taken into account in the model since it
is assumed that standard insurer is representative of the Italian insurance market only. The volume
measure for this risk component is based on the expected premiums earned and written during the
following twelve months in order to consider new business, assuming a dynamic portfolio. Then gross
premium volume which is relevant for risk capital valuation will be equal to:
VPre,h = max[Bt+1; Bt], (30)
while for the net volumes this value would be multiplied by a gross-to-net premium adjustment factor
BNET/B.
According to the VaR risk measure at Solvency II confidence level in a one-year time horizon,
the capital requirement (SCR) for premium risk could be derived through our simplified internal
model introduced in Section 2, referring to the time horizon [t, t + 1], as:
SCRt = VaR99.5%(U˜t+1 −Ut) = −Quantile0.5%(Y˜NETt+1 ). (31)
Formula (31) is recognizing expected profit/losses in the capital requirement evaluation by
considering safety loadings. This approach would be not conservative if a negative safety loadings
were in force and a negative technical result would be expected, implying a consequent higher
risk profile.
4. Numerical Analysis for Risk Assessment Gross and Net of Reinsurance Mitigation
To show the effect of a Partial Internal Model (PIM) for premium risk in the case of reinsurance
based on a CRM consistent with the framework introduced in previous Section 2, three non-life
insurance companies with a different size are considered (their figures are summed up in Table 2).
It is assumed that all insurers underwrite contracts in same three LoBs (MVL, OM, and GL) with the
same mix of portfolio (proportions used are approximately the real proportions in the Italian insurance
market for these three LoBs). In the beginning, comparison of results gross of reinsurance will allow
us to describe the effects of a different portfolio dimension on the aggregate claim amount distribution
and so on the capital requirement. Then, it will be possible to assess also impacts of reinsurance
strategies on insurers risk profile.
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Table 2. Baseline Portfolio Mix in terms of Gross premium volumes (amounts in million of Euro).
LoBs
Omega Tau Epsilon All Insurers
Bt Bt+1 Bt Bt+1 Bt Bt+1 Bt,h/∑h Bt,h
MVL 600 630 300 315 60 63 60%
OM 200 210 100 105 20 21 20%
GL 200 210 100 105 20 21 20%
TOTAL 1000 1050 500 525 100 105 100%
The main parameters of CRM are in Table 3. Insurers have the same characteristics apart from
expected number of claims denoting the size of Insurer. Omega is assumed to be five times larger than
Tau, and ten times larger than Epsilon in terms of GWP. Omega, Tau, and Epsilon are assumed to be
hypothetical insurance companies representative of the Italian insurance market, whose parameters
have been calibrated by historical results observed during the last 12 years (time horizon 2006–2017)
and contained in Year End balance sheets of non-life Italian insurers reported every year by Italian
insurers Association (ANIA) on its website, also on an aggregate basis.
In particular, parameters calibration have been based on data from some specific sheets required
by Italian insurers supervision (IVASS) and very similar to EIOPA’s Quantitative Reporting Templates
related to claim processes. Standard deviation of systematic volatility (σq) and the safety loading
coefficient (λ) are obtained by Italian market Loss Ratios and Combined Ratios. Regarding the
latter, it depends by the average of empirical combined ratios observed during the previous 12 years;
negative values of this coefficient represent LoBs where an average of combined ratios greater than
100% (e.g., in GL) is registered. The CoV of claim size cZ is fixed, for each LoB, and calibrated on the
basis of volatility of single claim size observed in empirical datasets of non-life insurance companies
in the previous calendar years. Furthermore, a dynamic portfolio is assumed and then nt and mt,
reported in Table below for the initial year for each LoB considered, will increase accordingly with
annual rate of real growth g as to frequency and annual claim inflation rate i as to severity, assumed to
be almost 2% and 3% respectively for all LoBs in the simulations.
Table 3. Parameter for Collective Risk Model (CRM) analysis of Premium Risk.
Insurer LoBs nt σq g mt cZ i λ c
Omega
MVL 114,846.03 7.9% 1.95% 4000 7 3% 2.8% 21.3%
OM 51,594.74 12.1% 1.95% 2500 2 3% 8.9% 29.8%
GL 14,260.81 14.7% 1.95% 10,000 12 3% −4.4% 31.8%
Tau
MVL 57,423.74 7.9% 1.95% 4000 7 3% 2.8% 21.3%
OM 25,797.01 12.1% 1.95% 2500 2 3% 8.9% 29.8%
GL 7130.40 14.7% 1.95% 10,000 12 3% −4.4% 31.8%
Epsilon
MVL 11,484.60 7.9% 1.95% 4000 7 3% 2.8% 21.3%
OM 5159.47 12.1% 1.95% 2500 2 3% 8.9% 29.8%
GL 1426.08 14.7% 1.95% 10,000 12 3% −4.4% 31.8%
Table 4 shows some features of reinsurance structures as retained quota and reinsurance
commission rate for QS and attachment point, net single claim cost, and safety loading coefficient
applied on reinsurer premium for XL. Furthermore, for each strategy we assume an alternative
reinsurance pricing that is unfavorable for the primary insurer but more realistic.
With respect to QS treaty, we assume that retention quota is fixed for each LoB and we investigate
on the different impact given by deterministic reinsurance commissions in case they are less or equal
to insurer’s expense loading. For the bottom, loss in expenses loading is represented as a percentage of
expenses loading coefficient of primary insurer (∆cRE,2h ≥ 0) in (11)), it has been fixed at 20% · ch for
each LoB.
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For XL treaty, retention limits per LoB Mt,h are equal to the sum of average claim cost and a fixed
multiplier k of the standard deviation: Mt,h = E(Z˜t,h) + kh · σ(Zt,h) with kh = 15 for MVL and GL and
kh = 5 for OM, independently from insurer’s size. Usually this multiplier is greater when a bigger
insurer is considered but at the same time a greater multiplier has been assumed for long tails LoBs as
MVL and GL. Furthermore, a more realistic scenario with a reinsurer safety loading coefficient greater
than primary insurer safety loading coefficient is considered taking into account the reduction in
variability of the ceding company, and then for LoBs with higher (lower) cZ˜ we will assume an higher
(lower) λREh , this is particularly important for OM and GL. For the bottom, a favourable reinsurance
pricing can be assumed because of the low reduction of variability given by XL on risks of this LoB;
for the latter, where a negative safety loading coefficient has been assumed in original portfolio, we will
consider a very high reinsurance safety loading coefficient.
Second scenario for both reinsurance strategies would represent a more realistic arrangement that
can be achieved in reinsurance market, and we named it High scenario.
Table 4. Parameters of reinsurance strategies.
LoBs
Quota Share eXcess of Loss
αh ∆c
RE,1
h ∆c
RE,2
h Mt,h mM λ
RE,1
h λ
RE,2
h
MVL 95% 0 20% · cMVL 424,000 3831 2.8% 5%
OM 90% 0 20% · cOM 27,500 2398 8.9% 1%
GL 85% 0 20% · cGL 1,810,000 9393 −4.4% 10%
The next Table 5 reports characteristics of simulated distribution of losses for total portfolio and
for each LoB, obtained using software R (R Core Team 2018, Vienna, Austria) and applying 100,000
simulations so that a stable convergence of results with exact moments can be assured. CoV and
skewness of gross and net of reinsurance aggregate cost of next-year claims are figured out.
Table 5. Coefficient of variation (CoV) and skewness of simulated distribution for each LoB (Baseline
Portfolio Mix).
Insurers LoBs
X˜t,h Γ˜
QS
t,h Γ˜
XL
t,h
CoV γ CoV γ CoV γ
Omega
MVL 8.1% 0.17 8.1% 0.17 7.9% 0.14
OM 12.0% 0.23 12.0% 0.23 11.9% 0.22
GL 16.3% 1.15 16.3% 1.15 13.9% 0.28
TOTAL 8.4% 0.32 8.4% 0.30 8.0% 0.15
Tau
MVL 8.4% 0.19 8.4% 0.19 8.1% 0.14
OM 12.0% 0.23 12.0% 0.23 12.0% 0.23
GL 19.7% 3.17 19.7% 3.17 14.8% 0.28
TOTAL 8.8% 0.37 8.7% 0.34 8.1% 0.15
Epsilon
MVL 10.2% 0.82 10.2% 0.82 8.9% 0.16
OM 12.4% 0.25 12.4% 0.25 12.3% 0.25
GL 32.4% 6.02 32.4% 6.02 20.4% 0.46
TOTAL 11.9% 1.93 11.6% 1.74 9.3% 0.25
We have that the bigger insurer shows for several LoB a CoV not so far from value of the standard
deviation of the structure variable q˜ due to a relevant diversification effect given by the size, and results
put in evidence that effect of non-pooling risk is significant for OM. The presence of a size factor can be
noticed by the greater increase of variability showed by LoB with high coefficient cZ as GL of smaller
companies with respect to bigger insurers.
Focusing on the reinsurance effect, proportional and non-proportional treaties affect distribution
of the total claims cost in a very different way. As can be expected, QS reinsurance intuitively does not
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change characteristics of total claims distributions as CoV and skewness for single LoBs, while mean
and standard deviation are simply scaled by the retention quota αh. XL reinsurance, as well-known, has
different impacts on characteristics of aggregate claims cost (for each LoB) according to the magnitude
of cZ˜ of LoB considered and it hardly changes aggregate claims cost distributions of LoBs with higher
cZ˜ as MVL and GL (See Figure 4). Particularly, CoV and skewness of net distributions for each LoB
decrease thanks to this kind of reinsurance. Nevertheless, the relative effect of XL is higher as the size
of the company decreases, because of a higher pooling risk of smaller insurers.
MVL gross
€ Million
Mean= 241.2
STD = 20.3
MVL netQS
€ Million
Mean= 229.2
STD = 19.3
MVL netXL
€ Million
Mean= 231.1
STD = 18.7
OM gross
€ Million
Mean= 67.7
STD = 8.2
OM netQS
€ Million
Mean= 60.9
STD = 7.4
OM netXL
€ Million
Mean= 64.9
STD = 7.8
GL gross
€ Million
Mean= 74.9
STD = 14.6
GL netQS
€ Million
Mean= 63.7
STD = 12.4
GL netXL
€ Million
Mean= 70.3
STD = 10.4
Figure 4. Simulated distributions of Aggregate Claims Cost for Tau (for each Line of Business (LoBs)).
Aggregated distributions have characteristics very similar to MVL because of the high weight of
this segment in insurers’ portfolios, and differences arise as the size of the insurer decreases, but the
same comments on reinsurance effects made for a single LoB hold here. Total claims cost distribution
from gross to net of QS is affected by only differences arising from applying different retentions
between LoBs, and the relative effect decreases as the size of insurer grows. XL reinsurance effects
on volatility and shape of aggregated distribution on single LoB basis apply also on aggregate basis.
As can be seen from Table 5, the decrease in either CoV and skewness is higher for Epsilon.
The aggregation between LoBs has been derived with a simple Gaussian copula, where parameters
of the copula function have been calibrated by using the correlation matrix proposed by SF in
delegated acts (see Figure 5). Alternatively, we have to consider a hierarchical structure based on
Archimedean copulas, more properly considering significant tail dependency between several LoBs
(see (Cesari and Valerio 2019), (Savelli and Clemente 2009), and (Savelli and Clemente 2011)).
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Gross
€ Million
Mean= 383.5
STD = 34.1
NetQS
€ Million
Mean= 353.5
STD = 31.1
NetXL
€ Million
Mean= 366.0
STD = 29.9
Figure 5. Simulated distributions of Total Portfolio Aggregate Claims Cost for Tau.
Distributions of gross and net technical results are strictly related to distributions of total losses of
the portfolio (see Figure 6). Mean and volatility of technical result decrease because of reinsurance,
whereas distributions are characterized by a negative skewness since the r.v. Y˜NET is negatively
affected by the aggregate claim amount distribution. It is worth mentioning that in proportional
reinsurance pricing can have a significant impact on capital requirement when an IM is applied since it
affects the mean of technical result distribution in such a way that an higher pricing can hardly move
the whole distribution, and so the quantile 0.50%, left.
Gross
€ Million
Mean= 9.5
STD = 34.1
Skw= −0.43
NetQS
€ Million
Mean= 9.0
STD = 31.1
Skw= −0.40
NetXL
€ Million
Mean= 9.2
STD = 29.9
Skw= −0.18
Gross
€ Million
Mean= 9.5
STD = 34.1
Skw= −0.43
NetQS High
€ Million
Mean= 6.8
STD = 31.1
Skw= −0.40
NetXL High
€ Million
Mean= 8.5
STD = 29.9
Skw= −0.18
Figure 6. Simulated Net technical result distributions for Tau (green lines on x-value 0), according to
different reinsurance strategies.
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Figure 7 shows instead SCR ratios obtained as capital requirement for premium risk at time t,
derived using either a market-wide approach as in SF or IM introduced in the Section 2, divided
by past year gross written premium Bt (GWP), and when reinsurance is considered two alternative
pricing have been considered.
It is worth mentioning that the main differences of SCR ratios with SF from gross to net of
reinsurance arise from the related impacts on premium volume because all ratios reported are based on
GWP. Furthermore, as mentioned in Section 3 SF allows insurers in some LoBs to adjust gross volatility
factor in formula (29) by 20% (NPh = 80% for MVL and GL) when an XL treaty is in force.
On the left side of Figure 7 we report SF results, and intuitively the lack of a size factor can be
deduced from differences of SCR ratios between insurers in case of IM represented on the right side,
either for gross and net of reinsurance results. In the gross of reinsurance case, Epsilon have an SCR
ratio calculated with IM that is approximately 2 times the ratio of Omega, while SF consider the same
ratio for all insurers independently from the size.
SCR(SF) SCR(SF)QS SCR(SF)XL SCR(IM) SCR(IM)QS SCR(IM)QSH SCR(IM)XL SCR(IM)XLH
Epsilon 26% 24% 20% 29% 25% 26% 15% 15%
Tau 26% 24% 20% 16% 15% 15% 12% 13%
Omega 26% 24% 20% 14% 12% 13% 11% 12%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
Figure 7. Baseline portfolio mix: ratio Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR)/B.
With regard to reinsurance, the convenience of reinsurance for Epsilon can only be given by XL
because of IM results lower than SCR ratios calculated with SF. On the other hand, Tau would need
to implement an IM because it would decrease the SCR ratio by around 10% if compared with SF.
We have also considered an unfavorable pricing denoted by letter H near to the reinsurance type (QS or
XL) in Titles of columns number 6 and 8.
A lower reinsurance commission in QS results in a deterioration of ratios for all insurers
considered, because translation of the distribution leads to a translation of quantile 0.50% and so of the
SCR, and this effect is smoothed as the size of insurer decreases. An higher reinsurance safety loading
in XL reinsurance does not heavy affect SCR ratios for all insurers because this kind of reinsurance is
particularly favorable in terms of volatility, so that the negative effect on the mean is partially offset
by the lower variability of the net distribution. The unfavorable effect in case of XL decreases with
the size of insurer, and Omega shows bigger increase of SCR ratio because of an higher pricing than
smaller insurers.
5. Numerical Analysis in Case of Different Portfolio Mix
In order to investigate impacts of some different business strategies on insurers risk profile, two
others portfolio mixes will be introduced. Parameters of the model are the same introduced for baseline
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portfolio in previous Table 3, except of expected claims count nt that changes due to the different
GPW in each LoB in these two different scenarios. Their differences from baseline scenario will be
commented.
The first mix represents an insurer whose portfolio is Motor oriented. Mostly of the policies (90%)
are underwritten in LoBs MVL and OM, and portfolio figures are reported in the next Table 6.
Table 6. Motor oriented Portfolio Mix in terms of Gross premium volumes (amounts in mln of Euro).
LoBs
Omega Tau Epsilon All Insurers
Bt Bt+1 Bt Bt+1 Bt Bt+1 Bt,h/∑h Bt,h
MVL 500 525 250 263 50 52 50%
OM 400 420 200 210 40 42 40%
GL 100 105 50 52 10 11 10%
TOTAL 1000 1050 500 525 100 105 100%
We report characteristics of simulated distribution of losses in the next Table 7, obtained by again
applying 100.000 simulations to the Motor oriented portfolio using software R.
Principal comments already done on characteristics of simulated distributions of each LoB in
the baseline portfolio hold also for this mix, and differences arise from changes in claims count
distributions parameters nt of the LoB considered. The characteristics of MVL are only partially
affected by the different portfolio mix, with a negative effect on CoV and skewness that increase for
smaller insurers. OM shows more stable results in terms of variability if compared with baseline
portfolio, independent of insurer’s size, because of a low cZ˜. On the other hand, for GL both CoV and
skewness increase, and the relative effect is higher as the size of company decrease.
The relevant diversification effect given by size of the LoBs can be noticed by a greater increase
of variability showed by LoB with high coefficient cZ as GL of smaller companies with respect to the
bigger one. Focusing on the reinsurance effect, comments of the Baseline portfolio mix hold also in
this case for either QS and XL reinsurance.
Table 7. CoV and Skewness of simulated distribution for each LoB (Motor oriented Portfolio Mix).
Insurers LoBs
X˜t,h Γ˜
QS
t,h Γ˜
XL
t,h
CoV γ CoV γ CoV γ
Omega
MVL 8.2% 0.19 8.2% 0.19 8.0% 0.17
OM 12.0% 0.24 12.0% 0.24 11.9% 0.24
GL 21.3% 3.62 21.3% 3.62 14.8% 0.27
TOTAL 8.6% 0.24 8.5% 0.23 8.2% 0.18
Tau
MVL 8.5% 0.38 8.5% 0.38 8.1% 0.15
OM 12.0% 0.25 12.0% 0.25 12.0% 0.24
GL 24.9% 5.91 24.4% 5.91 16.4% 0.33
TOTAL 8.9% 0.30 8.9% 0.29 8.4% 0.18
Epsilon
MVL 10.6% 1.00 10.6% 1.00 9.0% 0.17
OM 12.2% 0.24 12.2% 0.24 12.1% 0.23
GL 42.3% 10.5 43.0% 10.5 25.6% 0.64
TOTAL 11.1% 0.99 11.0% 0.92 9.5% 0.23
Aggregated distributions have characteristics very similar to baseline portfolio because of weights
between LoBs in insurers’ portfolio, but some differences arise as the size of insurer increases. Bigger
insurer shows a negative impact of this mix on characteristics of total claims cost distribution gross of
reinsurance, because of loss of diversification between LoBs. On the other hand, Epsilon is differently
impacted by this mix because the higher GWP in LoB with lower cZ˜ more than compensate loss of
diversification given by concentration on motor segments. In QS reinsurance, differences arising from
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applying different retention between LoBs because of the small weight of LoBs with lower retention as
GL disappear. XL reinsurance shows a lower effect on volatility and skewness of aggregated claims
cost distribution for a similar reason.
Figure 8 shows SCR ratios for Motor oriented portfolios. It can be easily seen a general decrease
of all SCR Ratios because of lower CoV of LoBs within portfolio is distributed (90% of the portfolio is
related to MVL and OM).
SCR(SF) SCR(SF)QS SCR(SF)XL SCR(IM) SCR(IM)QS SCR(IM)QSH SCR(IM)XL SCR(IM)XLH
Epsilon 24% 22% 20% 20% 18% 19% 12% 12%
Tau 24% 22% 20% 13% 11% 12% 10% 10%
Omega 24% 22% 20% 11% 11% 11% 9% 9%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
Figure 8. Motor portfolio mix: ratio SCR/B.
Regarding differences between SF and IM, now in either gross and net of reinsurance case all
insurers can implement an IM in order to save some capital. When a lower reinsurance commission
in QS is considered, even a bigger insurer such as Omega has an SCR ratio close to the gross of
reinsurance case because of the effect of changing proportions between LoBs into portfolios made
by QS leads to loss of diversification between them. This portfolio is not particularly affected by an
higher reinsurance safety loading in XL because of a lower incidence on portfolio of LoBs with higher
cZ˜ as GL.
The second mix represents an insurer whose portfolio is Liabilities oriented. Mostly of the policies
(90%) are underwritten in LoBs MVL and GL, and portfolio figures are reported in the next Table 8.
Table 8. Liabilities oriented Portfolio Mix in terms of Gross premium volumes (amounts in mln
of Euro).
LoBs
Omega Tau Epsilon All Insurers
Bt Bt+1 Bt Bt+1 Bt Bt+1 Bt,h/∑h Bt,h
MVL 500 525 250 263 50 52 50%
OM 100 105 50 52 10 11 10%
GL 400 420 200 210 40 42 40%
TOTAL 1000 1050 500 525 100 105 100%
The same results in Table 7 are reported in the next Table 9, but the comments are opposite of the
ones given for the Motor situation, and again differences arise from changes in claims count of LoBs
OM and GL. In this case effects are smoothed because of long tails of LoBs are considered. We have a
skewness not so far from value 0 due to a more relevant diversification effect given by higher weight
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of GL. Results show an higher volatility for OM due to lower nt. Also in this case QS Reinsurance
intuitively does not affect the characteristics of total claims distributions for single LoBs. On the other
hand XL reinsurance has a lower impact on GL because basic characteristics in gross of reinsurance
case are already positively impacted by this mix if compared with the motor oriented portfolio.
Aggregated distributions have higher CoV and skewness because of the high weight of MVL and
GL. Total claims amount distribution from gross to net of QS shows lower CoV and skewness because
this portfolio is oriented on LoBs with lower retention, and the relative effect increases as the size of
insurer grows because of the higher GWPs. Results shows the huge impact of XL reinsurance on this
mix if compared with the others because of higher weight of “long tails” LoBs. Effects on volatility
and skewness of net aggregated claims cost distribution increase as insurer’s size decrease and infact
Epsilon shows the highest benefit in terms of CoV and skewness of all portfolio mixes and size of
insurer considered.
Table 9. CoV and skewness of simulated distribution for each LoB (Liabilities oriented Portfolio Mix).
Insurers LoBs
X˜t,h Γ˜
QS
t,h Γ˜
XL
t,h
CoV γ CoV γ CoV γ
Omega
MVL 8.2% 0.17 8.2% 0.17 8.0% 0.15
OM 12.1% 0.25 12.1% 0.25 12.1% 0.24
GL 14.7% 0.54 14.7% 0.54 13.4% 0.25
TOTAL 9.1% 0.27 8.9% 0.26 8.6% 0.16
Tau
MVL 8.5% 0.22 8.5% 0.22 8.1% 0.15
OM 12.2% 0.24 12.2% 0.24 12.1% 0.24
GL 16.2% 1.04 16.2% 1.04 13.9% 0.28
TOTAL 10.0% 0.93 9.9% 0.86 8.9% 0.21
Epsilon
MVL 10.8% 1.14 10.8% 1.14 9.1% 0.18
OM 12.8% 0.25 12.8% 0.25 12.7% 0.25
GL 28.3% 4.79 28.3% 4.79 17.1% 0.34
TOTAL 13.9% 2.19 13.6% 1.37 10.5% 0.27
SCR ratios for Liabilities oriented portfolios are shown in the next Figure 9. The main differences
of SCR ratios between SF from gross to net to reinsurance grow in XL because of applying NPh = 80%
in Equation (29) for MVL and GL, which represent 90% of this portfolio. There is a general increase in
SCR ratios because of higher CoV of LoBs considered, and differences between SF and IM arise for
smaller insurers.
It is worth noting the translation effect given by QS High pricing, decreasing as the size of the
insurer decreases. An higher reinsurance safety loading in XL reinsurance does not heavy affect SCR
ratios for all insurers because this kind of reinsurance is particularly favorable in terms of volatility,
so that negative effects on the quantiles are partially offset by the lower variability of net distribution.
On the other hand, the relatively more negative effect of an higher XL pricing on SCR ratios of bigger
insurers increases because of the higher weight of LoBs where this kind of reinsurance has a positive
impact, as in MVL and GL.
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SCR(SF) SCR(SF)QS SCR(SF)XL SCR(IM) SCR(IM)QS SCR(IM)QSH SCR(IM)XL SCR(IM)XLH
Epsilon 29% 26% 22% 36% 31% 32% 19% 20%
Tau 29% 26% 22% 22% 19% 20% 16% 17%
Omega 29% 26% 22% 17% 15% 15% 15% 15%
0%
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20%
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35%
40%
Figure 9. Liabilities portfolio mix: ratio SCR/B.
6. Medium-Term Assessment and ORSA
One of the key indicators of insurance business after Solvency II is the Solvency Ratio (SR), defined
as the ratio between the OF and the SCR at time of evaluation for premium risk only. The former
represents the available financial resources of an insurance company at the end of a calendar year as the
sum of the initial capital and the technical result, the latter has been already commented and analyzed.
In the methodological framework given in the previous sections the SR at the time t can be
computed as:
SRt =
Ut
SCRt
, (32)
where we assume that the capital at the end of the year Ut has been observed and so it is not stochastic,
whereas SCRt is assumed to be at the time of its calculation.
As is well-known, SCR computed by either SF or IM considers only one year of new business.
In the consideration of the overall solvency needs required by Solvency 2 Pillar II to be reported
in the ORSA report, the risks resulting from the perspective business shall be taken into account,
and then Solvency II ratio projections are made on the basis of the strategic business plan for a
time horizon of 3 or 5 years. So we need a methodology in order to consider capital adequacy
over the planning period, and the dynamic context as the evolution of assessment framework is
provided by the projection of future financial position including capital requirements (SCRt) and Own
funds (Ut), fixing a target capital ratio that insurers must not breach in order to have an appropriate
capital planning. These amounts are based on multiple assumptions and parameters (combined ratios,
expected dividends, etc.) and the LoB evolution shall be considered. It is worth mentioning that this
method is appropriate for the business plan where there are no material change in the risk profile
during the considered time horizon.
With regard to Own Funds projection, it considers at least the following elements: run-off of the
inforce business, new business expected to be written over the strategic plan horizon and the market
evolution (including underwriting cycles). Then the r.v. U˜t is estimated in each year t as the sum of
initial own funds and the net expected profit of the year:
E(U˜t+1) = Ut + E(Y˜NETt+1 ). (33)
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In the projections of the Solvency Capital Requirement over the following 3 or 5 years, the results
of the last year calculation are the starting point of the calculation of the following years. SCR figures
are then projected for each sub-risk and aggregated to the total SCR, using assumptions on the run-off
of the inforce business and new business mix consistent with the ones used for the projection of own
funds/strategic plan. We can use Equation (31), where over the following years the key drivers used
to project the SCR are the premium volume and the business mix development.
The probability distributions of gross and net technical results of the valuation year and over the
following 3 years are simulated and reported in the next Figure 10. Reinsurance affects yearly the
gross technical result in a similar way as it does at the first year, reducing the mean and the volatility.
On the other hand, distributions are characterized by a less negative skewness during the following
years, because of the size factor effect given by the volume growth.
Once both OF and SCR (using IM) have been projected, the Solvency II ratio (32) for the years
over the first can be easily derived by calculating the ratio between the two amounts as given above
for k = 2, 3:
E(S˜Rt+k)ORSA =
E(U˜t+k)
SCRt+k
=
E(U˜t+k−1) + E(Y˜NETt+k )
SCRt+k
. (34)
When this ratio is higher than the target capital ratio over the plan period, this allows potential
dividend payments each year. This is related with the Risk Appetite Framework, one of the key pillar
of the risk management system, which provides risk governance tool to set risk limits and monitor
risk positions.
The next Table 10 reports SR for company Tau over the following three years according to the
two different reinsurance strategies already used in the paper. The initial capital U0 has been fixed
at 25% of the initial GWP B0 (500 million euro in any scenario), so that the starting SR in the gross of
reinsurance case is 135% and this value can be interpreted as the initial Risk Appetite of Tau in the
Baseline scenario.
In the baseline scenario insurer shows stable results in terms of both OF and SCR and so on SR,
because of the high weight on portfolio of a stable LoB as MVL. SR increases over the years, remaining
over 135% in any case, whereas net of reinsurance cases show higher values of the ratio than can be
used when an higher SR would be achieved (i.e., in capital management perspective).
Table 10. Solvency Ratio (SR) for Tau during the following 3 years (amounts in mln of Euro) (Baseline
Ptf—20% GL).
t 0 1 2 3
Gross
OF 125.0 134.5 144.5 154.9
SCR 92.8 96.1 101.4 105.7
SR 135% 140% 142% 147%
Net QS High
OF 125.0 131.8 141.7 152.1
SCR 85.9 89.5 93.4 98.2
SR 145% 147% 152% 155%
Net XL High
OF 125.0 133.5 143.4 153.8
SCR 75.8 79.2 82.9 87.5
SR 165% 169% 173% 176%
As can be seen in the next Tables 11 and 12, business strategy hardly influences the solvency
position of an Insurer, in such a way that a different portfolio mix impacts not only the magnitude of
OF and SCR but also the behaviour of the SR over the years.
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Table 11. SR for Tau during the following 3 years (amounts in mln of Euro) (Motor Ptf—10% GL).
t 0 1 2 3
Gross
OF 125.0 141.4 158.3 175.9
SCR 77.6 81.0 84.6 88.5
SR 161% 174% 187% 199%
Net QS High
OF 125.0 137.8 151.2 165.1
SCR 73.0 76.4 78.3 82.6
SR 171% 180% 193% 200%
Net XL High
OF 125.0 140.6 156.9 173.7
SCR 66.4 68.9 71.6 74.3
SR 188% 204% 219% 234%
In particular, a portfolio oriented on the Motor segment shows better results than in the Baseline
scenario, with a significant increase in the OF is only partially offset by the increase of the SCR, leading
to a SR from 161% at the starting year to 200% at the end of the projection. This value increases
when other reinsurance strategies are also considered, with a significant impact of XL because of an
important decrease in the SCR only partially attenuated by the decrease in the OF due to the cost of
the coverage.
Table 12. SR for Tau during the following 3 years (amounts in mln of Euro) (Liabilities Ptf—40% GL).
t 0 1 2 3
Gross
OF 125.0 126.9 129.0 131.3
SCR 114.6 118.6 120.8 124.9
SR 109% 107% 107% 105%
Net QS High
OF 125.0 124.6 124.3 124.1
SCR 103.2 107.0 107.8 113.7
SR 121% 116% 115% 109%
Net XL High
OF 125.0 125.5 126.2 127.0
SCR 92.9 95.8 98.5 101.8
SR 135% 131% 128% 125%
On the other hand, a portfolio oriented on Liabilities segments shows an hard decrease of the
SR over the time horizon because the lower technical results over the years do not let OF to grow
as the SCR does. The SR moves from 109% at the starting year to 105% at the end of projections.
Reinsurance arrangements partially attenuate this behaviour but they amplify their effects over the
years of projection. Furthermore, the QS strategy negatively impacts a company’s OF that decreases in
the planning period while the SCR grows, and then the fall in SR is more significant than in the other
two strategies (gross and net of XL reinsurance). It is important to note that the XL strategy already
helps an insurer to improve its solvency position at the starting year and over the planning period,
with an increase of both OF and SCR lower than in the gross case.
Our results show how the behaviours of the SR drivers are amplified by the presence of XL and
QS reinsurance, either in the positive or negative directions. They obviously achieve a reduction of the
SCR because of the lower volatility of the Aggregated distribution of claims due to reinsurance. On the
other hand, insurers must pay attention to the pricing structures of the reinsurance arrangements in
force, where higher pricing can lead to a reduction of the technical result and so of the OF, if compared
with either gross of reinsurance case and a multi-year time horizon.
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Figure 10. Simulated Gross and Net technical result distributions for Tau (green lines on value 0),
during the following 4 years—Baseline Portfolio mix (the k-th row represents Y˜k distribution).
7. A Medium-Term Model for the Net Risk Reserve
Now we consider risk reserve equation over several years. Starting from time 0 we develop
Equation (1) in the gross of reinsurance case fixing a number of years larger than 1, generally here
defined T:
U˜T = U0 +
[
L
∑
h=1
T
∑
s=1
[
(1+ λh) · Ph,s
]
−
L
∑
h=1
[ T
∑
s=1
X˜h,s
]]
, (35)
where all assumptions made in the first paragraph about classical risk reserve ratio Equation (1)
hold. In the big square bracket we can find the difference between the sum of the gross premium
volume (net of expenses) over T years and the total claims cost over T years. The latter value has been
defined as the aggregation over the T years of the sum of total claims cost of the h-th LoB, assumed
to be independent. Some accuracy must be taken on the aggregation between LoBs in the case of a
multi-year distribution and its impact on the solvency analysis and capital requirements in case of
time dependency of claim costs.
Risks 2019, 7, 72 25 of 29
Reinsurance effects are taken into stochastic Equation (35) in order to show how these treaties
impact over insurer’s expected profit as well as its risk profile in the medium term because, usually,
reinsurance treaties also use a multi-year approach.
With regard to net of QS treaty, the following risk reserve equation is obtained:
U˜NET,QST = U0 +
[
L
∑
h=1
T
∑
s=1
[
(1+ λh) · αh · Ph,s
]
−
[ L
∑
h=1
t
∑
s=1
·(1− αh) · Bh,s · ∆cREh
]
−
L
∑
h=1
[ t
∑
s=1
Γ˜h,s
]]
. (36)
In case of XL reinsurance, the net risk reserve Equation (36) turns into:
U˜NET,XLT = U0 +
[
L
∑
h=1
T
∑
s=1
[
(1+ λh)− (1+ λREh ) · piREh · Ph,s
]
−
L
∑
h=1
[ T
∑
s=1
Γ˜h,s
]]
, (37)
where piREh is the ratio between original and reinsurance risk premium (P
RE
h /Ph).
In the next Figures 11, 12 and 13 the net risk reserve ratio in a three-years analysis is reported
both gross and net of Reinsurance in the Baseline portfolio mix case. With regard to reinsurance
pricing structures, we analyze the more realistic situation that has been defined as Higher pricing in
the previous Sections 4 and 5. Starting values is fixed at 25% as in the previous Section 6.
The quantiles of risk reserve are mitigated on both sides by the presence of reinsurance, more so
with XL than with QS because of the reduction of the volatility. It is worth noticing that in the last two
years the 0.50% quantiles are lower than 0 either for Gross and Net QS, while it is always positive over
the planning period in the case of XL. On the other hand, the mean increases during the time horizon
for all the distributions considered because of the positive technical results of the years.
Once we have fixed the methodological framework underlying our medium-term
model, it needs to be developed into a capital requirement calculation technique
(see (International Actuarial Association 2004)). Such analysis can be alternative as well as
additional to the one carried on the previous Section 6 for a medium-term assessment of Insurance
risks. Nevertheless, we can improve the methodology of Section 3 (one-year approach for the SCR) by
introducing a multi-year approach to the SCR consistent with Solvency 2 framework provided by
Delegated Regulation.
Equation (31) can be generalized accordingly with a confidence level e in a time horizon [0, T],
and then we obtain for the multi-year SCR Premium Risk:
SCR(0, T|e) = VaRe(U˜T −U0) = U0 −Quantile1−e(U˜T), (38)
where
Quantile1−e(U˜T) = −Quantile1−e(
T
∑
s=1
Y˜NETs ). (39)
Formulas (38) and (39) as in Formula (31) are recognizing expected profit/losses in the capital
requirement evaluation by considering safety loadings over all of the years considered.
In practice, we can introduce an alternative SCR that considers not only a one-year but also a
multi-year time horizon, as in (International Actuarial Association 2004), taking the maximum between
these quantities:
SCR∗0 = max[SCR(0, 1|99.5%); SCR(0, 2|99%); SCR(0, 3|95%)]. (40)
This approach permits to consider the business evolution over the company’s Industrial Plan
in the calculation of the solvency capital requirement, and it would likely change consistently with
business strategy the amount of capital required to insurance companies.
To show the effect of this different capital requirement, three years with a different confidence
level are considered and the corresponding quantiles of risk reserve distribution for Tau are reported
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in Table 13. The comparison of results gross and net of reinsurance will allow to describe the effect of
different capital threshold on the solvency position, while a more deep analysis on differences with
other possible portfolio mix, especially with regards to quantiles, let us justify the applicability of this
rule in a more realistic market context. SCR computed through Equation (39) for T = 1 with e = 99.5%
and T = 3 with e = 95% are indicated in bold.
Baseline scenario results show that in three years the company would improve its solvency
position and the SCR(0, 1|99.5%) is greater than SCR(0, 3|95%). This behaviour is smoothed in case of
reinsurance, where QS is more effective than XL since they reduce the confidence intervals of the risk
reserve distribution and they are applied on a more balanced portfolio.
A portfolio oriented on Motor segments shows better results in terms of solvency, reducing SCR
and increasing differences between one-year and three-year quantiles. Reinsurance effects in terms of
lower SCRs decrease if compared with the baseline portfolio mix because of the lower weight of MVL.
On the other hand, an higher weight of “long tail” LoBs in the portfolio shows the most
interesting results. Here we have that SCR(0, 1|99.5%) is greater than SCR(0, 3|95%) only in the
gross of reinsurance case. QS results are very close to them while in the case of XL we have an
SCR(0, 1|99.5%) lower than SCR(0, 3|95%), even if they are lower than the gross SCRs.
Table 13. SCR for Tau according to different T and e (amounts in mln of Euro).
Mix 1− e Gross Net QSH Net XLH
0.5% 5% 0.5% 5% 0.5% 5%
Baseline
T = 1 92.8 48.6 85.9 46.1 75.8 42.3
T = 2 127.9 64.6 119.8 62.6 105.5 57.1
T = 3 147.5 74.7 140.1 73.6 118.3 65.0
Motor
T = 1 77.6 40.8 73.0 39.5 66.4 36.1
T = 2 102.5 49.4 98.5 49.6 89.0 45.6
T = 3 115.5 49.8 111.7 52.0 101.3 46.0
Liabilities
T = 1 114.5 63.4 103.2 58.8 92.9 55.7
T = 2 148.7 81.5 136.9 74.4 114.4 69.2
T = 3 186.7 108.7 172.7 103.3 151.3 94.6
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Figure 11. u˜t, for t = 0, 1, 2, and 3 Gross of Reinsurance-Baseline portfolio mix (u0 = 25%).
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Figure 12. u˜t, for t = 0, 1, 2, and 3 Net of Quota Share (QS) Reinsurance-Baseline portfolio mix
(u0 = 25%).
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Figure 13. u˜t, for t = 0, 1, 2, and 3 net of Excess of Loss (XL) Reinsurance-Baseline portfolio mix
(u0 = 25%).
The results reported above show the effectiveness of different reinsurance strategies considered.
QS reinsurance can be relevant for short-term to medium-term assessment of insurers’ solvency profile
as it can hardly change the mean of the technical result distribution. Furthermore, differences by row
between quantiles increase as the retention quota decreases, and significant attention must be paid to
the pricing structure of the proportional treaties in force, even in a less risky portfolio as Motor mix.
In the XL reinsurance results it has to be emphasized how this kind of reinsurance operates on lower
quantiles of technical result distribution on either a one-year or multi-year time horizon. Nevertheless,
it works significantly on more skewed distributions as in Liabilities oriented portfolio.
8. Conclusions
In this article we have provided a suitable PIM in order to make a short-term to medium-term
assessment of a Non-Life insurance risk profile, with particular regard to the Solvency II Premium
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Risk. In this evaluation, reinsurance as a risk-mitigation technique has been considered in our model
and its impact on our assessment opportunely reported and explained.
As numerical results evidence, business and risk strategy, as well as capital requirement
methodology, may have a huge impact on the assessment of financial position of insurers under
the new prudent regime of the European insurance industry. Risk mitigation techniques appear as a
key driver of Non-Life insurance business as they can change risk profile over either the short-term
or medium-term perspective. They impact the technical result of the year in such a way that it is
important to assess how reinsurance strategies decrease the volatility, reducing the SCR given by
the lower VaR, but, on the other hand, they also change the mean of distributions in different ways
according to the price for risk requested by reinsurers.
At the same time, risk mitigation also appears as a key driver of Non-Life insurance management
actions as it can improve business strategy and capital allocation (also in potential capital recovery
plans). Different portfolio mixes change insurers’ solvency positions, and the relative effect depends
on the insurer dimension and the type of reinsurance arranged. From a medium-term perspective,
a non-life insurer risk profile hardly depends on the business and risk strategy, particularly in terms of
insurance portfolio mix. On that point, the reinsurance again plays an active role in letting smaller
insurers survive in a dynamic and competitive market context, compensating the lower level of
dimension diversification in the case of XL treaty or reducing the full range of the amount at risk in the
case of a Quota Share.
On the other hand, a medium-term capital requirement would ask insurers to have more capital
than in a one-year time horizon. Furthermore, this effect can vary a lot between insurers with not
balanced portfolios, where more volatile LoBs can deteriorate solvency position of the companies.
In this framework, risk mitigation effects linked to reinsurance strategies must be assessed on either
risk/return perspective trade-off as figured out in the previous section.
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Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
CRM Collective Risk Model
GWP Gross Written Premiums
SF Standard Formula
IM Internal Model
SCR Solvency Capital Requirement
LoB Lines of Business
OM Other Motor insurance
MVL Motor Vehicle Liabilities insurance
GL General Liabilities insurance
QS(H) Quota Share Reinsurance (High Pricing)
XL(H) eXcess of Loss Reinsurance (High Pricing)
ORSA Own Risk and Solvency Assessment
SR Solvency Ratio
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